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World War II: 75th Anniversary

Matthew Ridgway and
the Battle of the Bulge
Conrad C. Crane

O

ne of the richest collections at the Army Heritage and Education
Center is that of Matthew B. Ridgway, who served with
distinction in World War II as a division and corps commander,
in Korea as an army and theater commander, and eventually as chief
of staff of the Army. He was in the habit of writing a memorandum
for his personal diary every day describing key events. Furnished here
are excerpts from his war diary during the Battle of the Bulge, when he
commanded the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. Events were moving so fast
for him that he had to consolidate his entries for the first few days. But
he still took time to create longer entries for key decisions. His account
provides a rich picture of the decisions a senior leader may face in largescale combat operations.
Ridgway rarely gets proper credit for his role in the Bulge. As
described in his diary, his corps, in the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force strategic reserve in the United Kingdom, was
alerted on December 17, 1944, for movement to the continent. He
soon detached his 101st Airborne Division to VIIIth Corps to defend
Bastogne, while retaining the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by
MG James M. Gavin, to bolster the defense of the north shoulder of
the enemy penetration under control of First US Army. He was also
eventually given command of all (or elements) of the 30th and 84th
Infantry Divisions and three armored divisions, along with the shattered
remnants of the 106th Infantry Division, a total force more the size of
an army than a corps.
One of Ridgway’s key early decisions was to abandon, finally, the
key town of St. Vith, heroically defended by the 7th Armored Division.
That thorn in the German side had significantly slowed their advance
and helped channel their drive west instead of north. Ridgway included
in his diary letters from BG Robert “Bob” Hasbrouck, commander of
the 7th, and records of conversations with MG William Kean, chief of
staff of First Army. Ridgway wrestled with many problems. He had to
quickly absorb the new units into his corps and create relationships with
their commanders. He had to figure out what to do with MG Alan Jones,
who had two of his regiments surrender and had only parts of his 106th
division left, but technically outranked Hasbrouck in St. Vith. (Ridgway
eventually moved Jones up to be his deputy.) As the battle over the town
continued, there was a major reorganization of Allied forces, as Field
Marshall Bernard Montgomery of the 21st Army Group took overall
command of all forces on the north side of the Bulge, another new
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personality for Ridgway to deal with. And German pressure on the key
bottleneck increased. Hasbrouck’s letters describe his situation clearly,
and Ridgway’s recounting of his conversation with Kean show how the
corps commander viewed his options and responsibilities for the troops
in the town. He also considered the ramifications of heavy bombing
of Belgian towns through cloud cover to possibly support St. Vith, an
option deemed unacceptable at the time. Ridgway had to balance the
needs of the defense with the welfare of the soldiers involved. When
withdrawal was finally authorized, it was a near-run thing, with many
casualties, among retreating infantry of BG Bruce Clarke’s combat
command especially. Hasbrouck and Clarke thought Ridgway should
have authorized the withdrawal sooner. But most of the division was
saved, and resistance against the German advance was maintained.
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Notified to move early on December 18, 1944, Ridgway initially
deployed to Bastogne along with his 101st Airborne. Ordered to
reorganize his corps and report to First US Army Headquarters (FUSA
HQ) for orders, he had to maneuver around German units to escape.
By the time he arrived at FUSA HQ, he had already developed a plan of
action for his new command.
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Called to FUSA HQ on the morning of December 20, 1944,
Ridgway received new orders and new units. He arranged a face-to-face
meeting with all his division commanders that afternoon, and issued
oral instructions for the next 24 hours of operations.
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Ridgway’s initial concept of his corps operation.
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On December 21, 1944, Ridgway was faced with the crisis at St. Vith,
the key position restricting the German advance in the early part of the
battle. BG Hasbrouck’s letter is clear describing the situation of his 7th
Armored Division, as well as that of other units there. Particularly vexing
is what to do with MG Alan Jones, of the shattered 106th Division.
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After assessing the options in St. Vith, Ridgway called the chief
of staff of FUSA. This memorandum presents Ridgway’s view of that
conversation. His description of the critical situation and plea for air
support included a discussion of the strategic implications of heavy
bombing of Belgian towns. Ridgway eventually received permission
to withdraw from St. Vith. The air attacks he desired were eventually
executed a few days later in clear weather.
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Even after pulling out of St. Vith, Hasbrouck’s situation remained
dire. Ridgway received this letter asking for permission to withdraw
further at 1150 on December 22, 1944.
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Within 35 minutes, Ridgway sent orders acceding to Hasbrouck’s
request. They were submitted through MG Alan Jones, who was
technically the senior officer on the scene. Eventually Ridgway would
pull him back to serve as the corps deputy. Early in the afternoon,
FUSA, with the approval of their new Army Group Commander,
approved pulling the battered division off the line and into corps reserve.
Montgomery was up at the front to see the situation for himself.

